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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4440
Subsidy policies on public urban transport have 
been adopted ubiquitously. In both developed and 
developing countries, subsidies are implemented to make 
transport more affordable. Despite their widespread 
implementation, there are virtually no quantitative 
assessments of their distributional incidence, making 
it impossible to determine if these instruments are 
pro-poor. This paper reviews the arguments used to 
justify subsidy policies in public urban transport. Using 
different tools to quantitatively evaluate the incidence 
and distributive impacts of subsidy policy options, the 
paper analyzes the findings of a series of research papers 
that study urban public transport subsidy policies in 
developed and developing countries. The available 
evidence indicates that current public urban transport 
subsidy policies do not make the poorest better off. 
This paper—a product of the Transport Cluster, Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Department of the World 
Bank—is part of a larger effort in the World Bank to increase the understanding of affordability in the transport sector. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted at 
nestupinan@worldbank.org, agomezlo@econ.uchile.cl, rmunozraskin@worldbank.org, and tserebrisky@worldbank.org.
Supply-side subsidies are, for the most part, neutral 
or regressive; while demand-side subsidies perform 
better—although many of them do not improve income 
distribution. Considering that the policy objective is to 
improve the welfare of the poorest, it is imperative to 
move away from supply-side subsidies towards demand-
side subsidies and to integrate transport social concerns 
into wider poverty alleviation efforts, which include the 
possibility of channeling subsidies through monetary 
transfer systems or through other transfer instruments 
(food subsidies, health services and education for the 
poor). The general conclusion of the paper is that 
more effort should be devoted to improve the targeting 
properties of public urban transport subsidies using 
means-testing procedures to ensure a more pro-poor 
incidence of subsidies. 
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The attention devoted to the relationship between poverty and transport is increasing 
considerably. Incorporating poverty issues and pro-poor components into the design of 
transport projects has become an important priority for multilateral banks.
2 Poverty, air 
quality and safety are among the most important objectives being pursued by developing 
countries that have recently embarked in urban transport reforms.  
 
In this context, it is possible to find a wide menu of policies aimed at making public 
transport “affordable” to poor households, which invariably imply some type of subsidy 
to benefit these individuals. As a general observation, subsidies are ubiquitous in the 
transport sector.  
 
In this paper we review the case for subsidies in the urban transport sector, discuss the 
available policies and the trade-offs involved in choosing optimal policies, and develop a 
methodology to quantitatively evaluate different policy options.
3 We try to answer the 
following questions: Why are transport subsidies needed in the first place? If a subsidy is 
going to be introduced (or an existing subsidy is going to be changed), what 
considerations should be borne in mind when designing policies? How should we 
quantitatively evaluate the different policy options available in order to guarantee a pro-
poor effect of a subsidy in the transport sector? What have we learned from subsidies in 
other sectors and past research in the transport sector?    
 
There is an extensive literature in the transport field justifying public transport subsidies 
on economic efficiency arguments. Most, but not all, of these arguments are “second 
best” in nature, in the sense that subsidies compensate for externalities in other parts of 
the economic system, namely, private transport use. In this context, public transport 
subsidies may reduce these externalities, improving resource allocation in society. Unlike 
the efficiency argument for subsidies, this paper emphasizes the social and distributive 
dimension of public transport subsidies. In this sense, it follows papers such as Frankena 
(1973), Pucher (1981), Guria and Gollin (1986) and Asensio, Matas and Reymond (2003) 
rather than the plethora of papers dealing with the externalities and efficiency aspect of 
the problem. Unlike these papers, however, we focus on developing country issues and 
experience.  
 
This paper is structured in the following way. Section 1 presents an introduction to the 
paper, the research questions and its structure. In Section 2 we discuss the rationale for 
transport subsidies. It is argued that in developing countries the case for these policies is 
not so clear-cut. A careful assessment of the objectives pursued when providing subsidies 
and the alternatives available—including policies outside of the transport sector—must 
                                                 
2 See for example Asian Development Bank (2001), The World Bank (2005), chapter 3 of The World Bank 
(2002), Gannon and Liu (1997) and a number of case studies on the subject commissioned by the World 
Bank in recent years, including SITRASS (2004a; 2004b), Shuiying, Han, Weili and Dening (2003), Howe 
and Bryceson (2000), Godard and Diaz Olivera (2000), and ECORYS and NEA (2004) among others.  
3 This paper deals exclusively with urban transport issues, although there are also social and poverty issues 
related to rural and interurban transport  
  2be made before recommending such policies. In Section 3 we then discuss the concept of 
affordability, the attempts made to quantify it and the problems found when trying to 
apply it to policy design. Sections 4 presents a typology of possible transport subsidies, 
and Section 5 discusses the criteria to evaluate the different design options and the trade-
offs involved. Section 6 develops a methodological approach to estimate the distributive 
incidence of transport subsidies that is simple to use and could contribute to assessing the 
distributive incidence of virtually all subsidies currently in place. Finally, Section 7 
presents a discussion of the lesson learned from research on subsidies in the utility sectors 
and presents evidence from prior research as well as four case studies in the transport 
sector completed in 2007 for a World Bank project. This evidence lays the groundwork 
for posing the critical questions that must be answered before further progress can be 
made in the area of poverty and transport.  
 
The main message that comes out of this paper is that it is not clear that transport 
subsidies that operate in isolation from more general welfare programs have been 
effective in alleviating the problems faced by the poor. Whether they can be made more 
effective is an open question, but current policies are not achieving this goal. There are 
reasons to be skeptical on how much can actually be improved. In this respect, it is 
imperative that affordability policies be designed within the framework of more all-
encompassing poverty reduction policies. This is an area that requires greater 
collaboration between transport specialists, economists and social welfare experts.   
   
 
2. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRANSPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
The study of subsidies in public transport is not a new area. There is an extensive 
literature that focuses on the design and implementation of subsidies. For the most part, 
this literature ignores the distributional incidence of subsidies and concentrates on the 
allocative efficiency case for public transport subsidies. In this section, we summarize the 
main arguments that support the efficiency and social justifications for subsidies in public 
transport.  
 
2.1. The allocative efficiency argument 
 
The allocative efficiency argument for transport subsidies can be divided in two 
complementary explanations.  
 
2.1.1. Underpricing of alternative travel modes 
 
The first is related to the underpricing of alternative modes of transport, particularly 
private car ownership. Users of these alternative modes do not pay the full cost they 
impose on society, in terms of infrastructure use, pollution, congestion, road safety risks 
and other environmental externalities. They are thus being subsidized. Therefore, by 
subsidizing public transport, competition between these alternative modes is placed on a 
level playing field and improves resource allocation.  
 
  3Parry and Small (2005) provide quantitative estimates of subsidies required to achieve 
allocative efficiency in Los Angeles and Washington D.C., that should cover between 
50% and 80% of average operating costs for buses and rail, respectively. For London, 
estimated figures are even higher (100%) due to the higher congestion attributed to 
private automobiles in this city.  
 
However, there are two problems with this justification for public transport subsidies, 
especially as concerns developing countries. First, they are all “second best” efficiency 
arguments since there are other ways to come closer to correctly price alternative travel 
modes. Fuel prices may be increased to internalize pollution and traffic risk externalities. 
Congestion tolls or infrastructure tolls can be used to make car users bare the full cost of 
their use of exiting road space. Only if these direct policies cannot be implemented, could 
public transport subsidies justified as a second —less efficient— option.
4  
 
Second, and more relevant to this paper, many of these arguments may not be as strong in 
a developing country context as in developed countries. Private car use, although rising, 
is usually far below the level in developed countries. In fact, in many developing 
countries, public transport is generally one of the major contributors to pollution, 
congestion and traffic risk problems. Therefore, it may be that public transport is 
underpriced as well as private car use. Indirect evidence for this is provided by Estache 
and Gómez-Lobo (2005) for the case of Santiago, Chile.
5 Similar evidence can be found 
for other middle and low income countries, where formal and informal public bus 
transport is a significant contributor to accidents, pollution and congestion.  
 
In addition, the social valuation of a clean environment, the time cost incurred in 
congested roads and attitudes towards risk are very different in developing countries 
where many people are still faced with more pressing concerns regarding their basic 
needs. Therefore, even when the underpricing of alternative modes of transport may 
sometimes justify public transport subsidies, the quantitative magnitude would most 
probably be much smaller than in developed countries.   
 
In summary, the efficiency argument for transport subsidies in developing countries, on 
average, is not so strong and definitely not as relevant as in developed countries. 
However, for some developing countries it may be argued that the underpricing of 
infrastructure for private travel may be just as relevant as in developed countries. As 
economic growth spurs private automobile ownership, governments in developing 
countries devote limited resources to expand road infrastructure without making users —
mostly the richer segments of society— pay for these investments.. 
 
                                                 
4 Subsidizing public transport will generally be less efficient than a direct solution to the underpricing of 
private car use, since it may encourage excessive travel and distort residential and commercial location 
decisions. In addition, taxes needed to fund subsidies create a deadweight loss in the economy.   
5 In Santiago, for example, private cars use gasoline, while buses use diesel. Thus the latter contribute 
directly to particulate matter pollution while the former do not as much. An interesting natural experiment 
happened in 2002, when bus operators went on strike. The evidence showed that compared to similar days, 
in terms of weather conditions, particulate matter pollution fell 50% in the city (see Garreud and Aceituno, 
2002). 
  42.1.2. Scale economies and user cost 
 
Another efficiency argument that may justify public transport subsidies is the Mohring 
effect (Mohring, 1972; see also Jara Díaz and Gschwender, 2005). This effect arises due 
to the fact that the total cost of a trip is not just the price paid for the mode chosen, but 
also includes the time cost of users. As additional supply is introduced into a transport 
system, average waiting times are reduced for all passengers.
6 However, the marginal 
unit supplied cannot appropriate the total amount of the higher value it creates, which 
equals the total reduction in users transport costs. Thus, the marginal private benefit of 
introducing an additional unit of supply is lower than the marginal social benefit. As a 
consequence, the private optimal supply level in a deregulated market would be lower 
than the social optimum. The social optimum supply level could then be achieved 
through a subsidy.  
 
However, there is doubt as to the material importance of this effect. Gómez-Ibañez 
(1999) argues that in practice the Mohring effect is small and does not warrant the 
implementation of subsidies. In regulated systems, supply conditions including 
frequencies, can be set by a regulator, solving the existence of the Mohring effect. In 
developing countries, where the time cost of passengers, as traditionally has been 
estimated, is lower than in developed countries —especially among the poor, who 
represent the majority of users of public transport—the Mohring effect becomes less 
important, thus reducing this effect as a justification for subsidies. 
 
Efficiency arguments based on economies of scale and scope in supply cannot be used 
either as a justification for subsidies in the transport sector for the same reasons that they 
have been out of favor in the natural monopoly industries. Funds have an opportunity 
cost, and thus, it could be more efficient to set tariffs at average cost, incurring a small 
efficiency loss, rather than to use scarce public funds in an effort to set prices at (loss 
making) marginal costs. Forcing services to be self-financing through average cost 
pricing of utility services may also have beneficial incentive and control properties.
7   
 
2.2. The social or distributive case for transport subsidies 
 
The previous section discussed why the argument for public transport subsidies based on 
efficiency arguments may not be very strong in developing countries. The arguments 
ignored the practical problems and possible distortions that such subsidies may cause. 
 
In developing countries, the social justification of subsidies seems to be of more concern. 
The social case for transport subsidies starts by recognizing the importance of accessible, 
available, and affordable transport for the well being of people. Transport, being a 
derived demand, becomes a complementary input to the obtainment of other social 
benefits such as education, health services and employment opportunities, among others. 
This is sometimes couched in the catch all concept of “social inclusion”, an appealing 
                                                 
6 This occurs up to a certain scale, after which average waiting time could increase. 
7 Incentive and control issues are very relevant in the transport sector. There is ample evidence indicating 
that operating subsidies are associated with operational inefficiencies.   
  5term that is unfortunately hard to define in an operationally useful way for policy 
decisions.   
 
The recognition that transport is important for peoples’ lives, especially among the poor, 
is not sufficient to justify subsidies specific to the transport sector. The main reason is 
that the same argument could be made for most other goods and services on which 
peoples’ lives depend upon, including water, electricity, telecommunications, food, etc. 
How are we to judge whether scarce funds should be used to improve individuals’ social 
inclusion through transport subsidies rather than by subsiding other services and merit 
goods? Or, why not let people decide for themselves by directly increasing their income 
instead of subsidizing services? 
 
The poor are not just ‘transport poor’ or ‘fuel poor’ (to use the UK terminology)
8, they 
are poor in an encompassing way. All basic needs, such as education, water, food, health 
and transport have a merit good component which justifies a social preoccupation with 
their affordability by the poor. Due to this multidimensional characteristic of poverty, a 
monetary transfer may be the best way to help the poor, rather than having a plethora of 
sectoral subsidies which are very hard to target correctly. Chances are that policies that 
operate through the welfare system —whose main objective is to identify and help the 
poor in a country— will have better distributive properties than sectoral subsidies. In 
principle then, equity and distributional concerns should perhaps be addressed by the 
general welfare system of a country and through the use of direct monetary transfers. 
This way the household decides how to spend this income among the different goods and 
services, based on their needs and constraints.  
 
As a concrete example, in Chile, rising transport costs due to the increase in the 
international price of oil during the years 2004 through 2006 were neutralized through 
direct compensatory payments benefiting 40% of the population rather than through 
subsidizing transport fares or inputs. This example is discussed in more detail in Box 1.  
 
That a monetary transfer may be better for households compared to a price subsidy can 
be shown by a very simple microeconomic argument reproduced in Appendix 1. The 
intuition is that with a transfer a household always has the option to use the additional 
resources to pay for their travel costs but it can also use these funds for other 
expenditures. Thus, it has an added degree of freedom which helps to raise welfare. An 
illustration of this point is given by the fact that in Brazil, many workers who receive 
transport vouchers from employers (‘vale transporte’) sell them in the secondary market 
instead of using them for travel.
9 These workers would be better off by an equivalent 
direct monetary transfer from employees rather than having to sell the vouchers with a 
discount in the secondary market.  
 
                                                 
8 See DETR (2000) for the use of the first term and Waddams-Price, Bennett and Cooke (2002) for the 
second. 
9 This subsidy scheme is described in more detail in Box 3. 
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Source: Gómez-Lobo (2007a)  
Box 1: Welfare transfers as a transport subsidy: Chile’s compensatory welfare payments 
due to rising transport costs 
 
With the rise in the international price of crude oil during the last five years there was 
mounting political pressure in Chile —as in many other countries— to shield domestic 
consumers from the impact of this rise on domestic fuel prices. Bus fares rose 31% between 
2003 and 2006 as a direct consequence of the increase in fuel prices. The consumer price 
index during this same period rose by only 7.5% indicating a very important relative price 
increase for public transport.  
 
Starting in 2004 authorities chose to give a direct monetary transfer to poorer households to 
compensate for rising fuel and public transport prices. It was argued that this policy was much 
more progressive and better targeted than policies aimed at reducing retail fuel prices. Similar 
transfers were again granted in 2005 and 2006 for the same reason.  
 
In the Presidential address for the budget law that conceded the 2004 transfer, the Executive 
declared that the transfer was sufficient for a poor beneficiary to fund higher domestic 
kerosene prices and nine months of higher public transport fares. Rising fuel prices was also 
explicitly mentioned as the motivation for the 2005 and 2006 transfer.  
 
Starting in 2005 eligible households included pensioners with government guarantees or 
support, households in the poverty-alleviation “Chile Solidario” program, families receiving 
the Family Subsidy, and workers who were receiving a family supplement subsidy and who 
earned less than Ch$180,000 (US$350) per month. The eligible population was close to 2.2 
million households, representing 40% of Chilean households.  
 
The fiscal cost of the 2005 and 2006 transfer was US$ 63 and US$42 million, respectively. It 
is important to note that in 2006, pensions had already been increased for poorer people and 
they were thus excluded from this special transfer. This explains the lower fiscal cost in 2006. 
All transfers were funded from general government budget. 
 
Gómez-Lobo (2007a) shows that in Santiago the transfer policy was much better targeted to 
the poor than alternative subsidies specific to the transport sector such as subsidizing bus fares 
or fuel prices. Thus, the social consequences of rising transport costs were countered without 
compromising the resource allocation benefits of cost reflective pricing for fuels and public 
transport.  
 
However, there are at least two important qualifications to the general recommendation 
of using transfers and the general welfare system to address affordability issues.
10 First, it 
may be that society has a special interest in the actual consumption of certain goods and 
services. This may be due to externalities in the consumption of these goods or because 
they are deemed to be merit goods. Potable water is a good example in this respect since 
public health concerns indicate that people should consume a minimum amount of this 
good irrespective of their personal preferences. In this case, a monetary transfer may not 
be a good substitute to a direct price subsidy since part of the transfer will often be used 
                                                 
10 For an excellent discussion of these and related issues see Alderman (2002). 
  7to purchase other goods and services.
11 It may also be that the intra-household allocation 
of resources differs according to the way benefits are distributed. A specific subsidy on 
the consumption of a good may increase the resources available to certain members of the 
household (women, children, elderly) that would not be available had the head of 
household received a monetary transfer.  
 
For transport subsidies there may be an argument along these lines in the case of 
children’s education, children and women’s access to health services and perhaps other 
goods and services requiring mobility. Society may value these goods more than the 
implicit valuation by the head of household or the parents´ interest may not coincide 
perfectly with children’s interest.
12 In this case the direct provision of subsidized 
transport may be a better mechanism to achieve society’s goals relative to a monetary 
transfer to the head of household.
13   
 
If the actual consumption of transport services is the justification for sectoral transport 
subsidies, then more emphasis needs to be placed on measuring the number of trips 
undertaken by individuals and how certain policy interventions affect this quantity, 
including studies to determine the elasticity of demand with respect to fare pricing.  
 
The second qualification is when the country does not have a well functioning welfare 
system. There may be no welfare instrument in place to channel financial resources to the 
poor, existing mechanisms may be very badly targeted or they may generate distortions 
worse than those created through sectoral subsidies. Setting up means testing mechanism 
to screen beneficiaries and the bureaucratic institutions to make monetary transfers on a 
regular basis may be very costly and cost-inefficient. 
 
Even in this case, some consideration should be given to improving or redesigning the 
welfare system to benefit the poor instead of relying on sectoral subsidies. Moreover, in 
the absence of formal targeting mechanisms subsidizing other goods and services besides 
transport, such as staple foods, may still be a more effective way to channel resources to 
the poor. This will depend on the consumption patterns of the poor and non-poor 
households, which is an empirical issue that should be evaluated when designing 
subsidies. 
 
In general then, the need and justification for subsidies will depend on the local context. 
The more institutionally developed a country, the less likely transport subsidies are 
justified on social grounds, as better alternatives to reach the poor are available. It is 
important to analyze all the available options to channel benefits to the poor and avoid 
narrow sectoral views on this subject.  
 
                                                 
11 For an illustration see Appendix 1. 
12 This usually calls for monetary transfers to be given preferably to female households members who in 
general are more empathic with children’s needs than male household heads.   
13 However, there are other ways to achieve the same goal of aligning household adult members` interest to 
those of their children; for example, by conditioning monetary transfers on children’s school attendance as 
in the Oportunidades program in Mexico. 
  82.3 Transport subsidies are a ubiquitous reality 
 
Justified or not, transport subsidies are ubiquitous, especially in developed countries and 
this is not a recent phenomena. For example, in Canada, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
public transport systems received subsidies between 5% and 30% of their costs in urban 
areas. These figures were even higher, close to 50%, for light railways (Frankena, 1973). 
Most of these subsidies were regressive in terms of their distributive impacts. In the 
United States the public transit services have received significant subsidies for capital 
expenditures and operation costs (Obeng, Azam and Sakano, 1997; Pucher, Markstedt 
and Hirschman, 1983).   
 
More recently, Parry and Small (2005) indicate that cost recovery from fares is 29% for 
US bus systems, 48% for US commuter rail and 25%-29% for transport systems of ten  
European nations. In the UK, £1 billion are spent annually in subsidizing local bus 
services (DfT, 2002) excluding the Greater London Authority transport grant. Subsidies 
in the Metropolitan Region of Madrid exceeded US$1.1 billion in 2005 (Vassallo and 
Villar, 2007). These are common examples of explicit subsidies, but implicit mechanisms 
as free parking and provision of infrastructure, are also very frequent.  
 
Similar summary statistics are not available for developing countries. However, case 
studies indicate that in most cases public transport, especially rail, metro and publicly 
owned bus companies are subsidized. The main difference with developed countries is 
that in many developing countries bus services are provided by numerous formal and 
informal operators (in cars, vans or mini-buses) under cost recovery fares. Thus, it will 
often be the case that the mechanized transport mode used most intensely by the poor, 
buses or mini-buses, will not be subsidized, while the modes used relatively more by 
richer segments of the population are more subsidized.   
 
2.4 Summary  
 
The main conclusion of this section is that in developing countries the need to subsidize 
public transport is not as obvious as it may seem, even if there are pressing social 
consideration at hand. This calls for a careful analysis of the objectives behind such 
policies and an evaluation of alternative subsidy instruments, including the use of welfare 
policies outside of the transport sector.  
 
However, under certain conditions direct transport subsides can still be justified. They 
may be the most effective instrument to promote society’s interest in the actual 
consumption of transport services, in particular among certain members of the household 
such as women, children or the elderly. In addition, there may not be many other 
alternatives available to channel resources to the poor, especially when a country lacks 
the resources (technical and human) to set up a general welfare system.  
 
If, for one of these reasons, or due to political considerations, transport subsidies are the 
chosen option, then it is imperative to analyze how to best design these subsidies and the 
trade-offs involved. In addition, since subsidies in the transport sector are ubiquitous 
  9around the world, this analysis can also help to provide guidance on how to improve 
existing subsidies. This is the topic taken up in the following sections of this paper.  
 
 
3. HOW TO DEFINE AFFORDABILITY IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 
 
Given that subsidies are usually justified based on the premise that they increase 
affordability of low income segments of the population, it is convenient to define the 
concept of affordability and how it can be used in practice. 
 
Most studies on poverty and transport estimate the percentage of monthly income or 
expenditure devoted to transport by poor families
14 and compare this figure to a 
benchmark considered “affordable” to households. Armstrong-Wright and Thiese (1987) 
consider that there is an affordability problem with public transport when more than 10% 
of households spend more than 15% of their income on work related trips. According to 
Venter and Behrens (2005), the South African government has established a 10% of 
income as a policy benchmark in its 1996 White Paper on Transport Policy (Department 
of Transport, 1996). Gomide, A., S. Leite and J. Rebelo (2004) use a 6% limit to estimate 
the affordability of public transport in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.  
 
This approach is not exclusive to the transport sector. Foster (2005) uses 15% of a 
household monthly income or expenditure as the way to define affordability of three 
public services (water, electricity, and gas). In the water sector, there is a well established 
rule of thumb —whose origin is attributed to the World Health Organization (WHO)— 
whereby a water bill representing more than 5% of monthly household income or 
expenditure is considered unaffordable.  
 
Although intuitively appealing, there are several problems with this affordability 
measure. The main one, as noted by Venter and Behrens (2005), is that the relation 
between welfare and expenditure on transport as a percentage of income may not be 
monotonic.
15 Therefore, it is not clear that households that spend less than 10% of 
                                                 
14 Examples of studies are Fouracre (2002) for Lagos, SITRASS (2004a and 2004b) for Conakry and 
Douala, Gómez-Lobo (2007a) for Santiago, among many others. In formal terms, this affordability measure 

















where xi(pi,y) are the number of trips —usually public transport trips or work related trips— taken during 
the month by household member i, and y is household income or expenditure. The number of trips is 
presented as an explicit function of the price of trips and household income. 
15 Venter and Behrens (2005) also discuss some practical problems with this affordability index. Besides 
the reliability of survey data, especially income figures, there is the problem that household level indices 
may obscure access and affordability by non-earners or non-household head members of the household. 
What is affordable from the household perspective may not necessarily imply affordability at the individual 
  10income or expenditure on transport are necessarily better off than people that spend more. 
As an example, it may be that due to the high price of public transport very poor people 
either walk or do not make many trips. Thus, their observed transport expenditure may be 
low but this is the result of a suppression of trips rather than a high level of income.  
                                                                                                                                                
 
Figure 1 presents an example which may be quite typical of cities in poor developing 
countries. Low income households may actually spend less than middle income 
households on transport. This is due the prevalence of walking as one of the main modes 
of travel.  
 
Figure 1: Expenditure on public transport by income level 
 



























































































A naïve interpretation of the affordability data from Figure 1 would indicate that only 
middle-income households require a subsidy given that they spend more on transport than 
the predefined affordability benchmark. The reason why the affordability benchmark fails 
in this case is due to the fact that financial (observed) transport expenditure is not the 
same as the generalized transport cost. If a shadow cost is used to value walking trips —
to account for the relative discomfort, time and energy required compared to other modes 
of travel— then the expenditure on transport by the poor would increase substantially. In 
addition, it may be that poor people demand fewer trips due to the high cost of travel.   
 
In order to overcome the above problem Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar (2005) use a fixed 
basket of trips to estimate an affordability index. They define affordability as “the ability 
to make necessary journeys to work, school, health and other social services, and make 
visits to other family members or urgent other journeys without having to curtail other 
essential activities”. Operationally, they use the percentage of monthly per capita income 
 
level. Using personal expenditure and income data to calculate the affordability index does not solve this 
problem since family resources are shared to some extent within the household unit.  
  11or per capita income of the lowest quintile of the income distribution in a city needed to 
make sixty 10 km trips per month.
16  
 
Table 1: Affordability index for different cities                                                        
assuming 60 trips per person per month 
Affordability Index   City 
Average Bottom  Quintile 
1 São  Paulo  11%  107% 
2  Rio de Janeiro  6%  63% 
3 Brasilia  6%  59% 
4 Cape  Town  4%  38% 
5 Buenos  Aires  4%  26% 
6 Mumbai  9%  23% 
7 Kuala  Lumpur  5%  22% 
8 Mexico  City  3%  19% 
9 Chennai  8%  19% 
10 Manila  5%  17% 
11 Krakow  6%  17% 
12 Amsterdam  6%  16% 
13 Moscow  4%  15% 
14 Guangzhou  4%  14% 
15 Warsaw  4%  11% 
16 New  York  3%  10% 
17 Los  Angeles  3%  10% 
18 Chicago  3%  10% 
19 Singapore  2%  10% 
20 Beijing  3%  9% 
21 Seoul  4%  9% 
22 Shanghai  2%  6% 
23 Cairo  3%  6% 
24 Budapest  3%  6% 
25 London  2%  5% 
26 Prague  2%  4% 
27 Bangkok  1%  4% 
Source: Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar (2005). 
 
                                                 











where  i x , a fixed parameter, replaces the observed number of trips taken by household member i, which in 
the case of Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar (2005) is 60 trips per month for each person. 
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Saurkar (2005) is that it makes it easier to estimate comparable affordability indices 
across cities and countries. Their main results are reproduced in Table 1, where the 
percentage of per capita income required to pay for 60 trips per month is presented for the 
average household and for households in the first quintile of the income distribution. 
Despite its attractiveness, there are problems associated with this affordability measure. 
In particular, it ignores possible changes in fares due to supply responses needed to 
accommodate the fixed number of trips considered. For example, if it were the case that 
every person made 60 trips per month, aggregate public transport demand would 
probably be much larger than current demand. Therefore, equilibrium fares would also be 
different unless there are constant economies of scale in public transport supply. The 
comparison made in Table 1 may be misleading since it does not control for the different 
scale of each transport system.  
 
There are two possible applications for the affordability index developed by Carruthers, 
Dick and Saurkar. First, as an indicator to determine whether public transport is too 
expensive in a given city and therefore that something should be done about it. However, 
this would require defining a benchmark of what is considered “affordable”. Is it 10%, 
15% or 5%? Any such benchmark is arbitrary and subject to further criticisms. For 
example, imagine two cities, one where the transport affordability index is 15% and 
another where it is 10%. One might be tempted to conclude that efforts should be made to 
reduce the transport costs in the first city. However, what if an analogous affordability 
index is estimated for food (or water, land or whatever other good or service one may 
care about) and it turns out that in the first city is represents 45% of income and in the 
second 50% of income. Is it still the case that lowering transport cost in the first city is so 
important? In the end, households would spend the same amount of their income in both 
transport and food.  
 
A second possible use of the affordability index is to evaluate the results of certain policy 
interventions. For example, it could be used to compare the affordability of transport 
before and after a certain policy was introduced. Economic theory does not have a 
definition of affordability but it does have well developed concepts to measure welfare 
changes. The use of changes in the affordability measure, as opposed to its absolute level, 
seems like a much more promising avenue for the practical use of this concept.  
 
In summary, although some notable efforts have been undertaken to measure 
affordability in the transport sector —especially Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar (2005)— it 
is still not clear what welfare interpretation can be given to these measures nor how we 
can use them to evaluate policy interventions.  
 
In spite of this it may still be a useful first approximation to determine the hardships 
faced by certain groups of the population and as a possible indicator of when further 
analysis may be warranted or not. As an example, the results of the case study of  
Madrid, Spain, summarized in Box 2, shows that for all income groups, the expenditure 
on urban transport is quite low. A possible interpretation of this result is that given 
current fares and subsidies affordability is not a pressing issue in this city. 
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Source: Vassallo and Pérez de Villar (2007)  
Box 2: Expenditure on urban transport in Madrid 
 
The following table presents the percentage of urban transport expenditure per household 
income in Madrid. It shows that for all income groups this expenditure is quite low. Although 
for poorer households this result may be partly due to repressed travel, the figures nonetheless 
do give the impression that distributional concerns are probably not among the most pressing 
issue related to public transport fares and reform in Madrid at this level of subsidization. This 
is not to say that there are no outstanding social or distributive concerns in this city, only that 
these problems perhaps should be addressed by other policies outside of the transport sector. 
 
 
Monthly income  Inhabitants  % expenditure on 
food 
% expenditure in 
urban public 
transport 
< 500 €  187,662  16.09%  0.95% 
500 € -1,000 €  890,371  16.85%  1.07% 
1,000 € - 1,499 €  1,493,780  17.31%  1.01% 
1,500 € - 1,999 €  1,269,356  14.66%  1.06% 
2,000 € - 2,499 €  632,309  14.47%  1.54% 
2,500 € - 2,999 €  416,801  12.57%  0.95% 
3,000 € - 4,499 €  601,772  11.36%  0.87% 
> 5,000 € 
(a) 123,522  10.49%  0.69% 
Notes: 
(a) The results for this level of income have little representativeness.
 
 
4. TYPOLOGY OF SUBSIDIES IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 
 
The evidence clearly shows there is a myriad of subsidies being applied to urban public 
transport. Independently of the reasons that justify these subsidies, a relevant question for 
a policymaker is, what are the options available when considering, designing or 
modifying subsidies? Subsidies can be classified along many dimensions according to 
who receives the financial transfers, the targeting mechanism used to distribute benefits 
and how they are funded. We will discuss each of these topics in turn.  
 
4.1 Who formally receives the subsidy? 
 
Formally, subsidies can be channeled to transport suppliers (supply side subsidies), or 
directly to beneficiaries (demand side subsidies). In turn, supply side subsidies can take 
two forms: infrastructure (or capital) subsidies or subsidies to cover operating costs. In 
both cases, the objective is to lower the cost of service to final users either by lowering 
the proportion of costs that must be funded from fares (supply side subsidies) or by 
lowering the monetary outlays of users (demand side subsidies). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that although the final goal of all these subsidies is to 
benefit users, in many cases some of the benefits (or costs) accrue to others. This is the 
case when supply side subsidies are captured by operators in the form of higher costs and 
inefficiencies. In the case of demand side subsidies, equilibrium changes in the prices of 
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subsidies may be shifted in unintentional ways among agents. These themes will be 
discussed further below. For now it is important to stress that care must be taken to 
identify correctly the winners and losers from these policies.  
 
4.2 How is the subsidy distributed? 
 
Subsidies can also be classified according to the method used to target beneficiaries. For 
example, demand side subsidies can be means tested, if some type of welfare instrument 
is used to gauge the socioeconomic condition of potential beneficiaries. Or they can be 
given to certain categorical groups, such as students or the elderly. Another method may 
be to use certain self-selection mechanisms. For example, if different quality services are 
offered, then the lower quality one may be subsidized as a way to target low income users 
who do not have the resources to pay for the higher quality service. Along the same lines, 
geographical targeting could also be used, targeting benefits and services to areas where 
the less well off households are overrepresented. 
 
In general, supply side subsidies will be less targeted than demand side subsidies, since 
they are given to operators who will usually not discriminate between different types of 
users. The exception is when operating subsidies are conditioned on certain performance 
targets, or when certain specific services (financially non-viable rural bus services, for 
example) are subsidized.  
 
4.3 How are subsidies funded? 
 
Subsidies can be funded by general taxation (direct and indirect), specific taxes including 
local taxes or cross-subsidies.  
 
Cross subsidies are internal to a company, mode or to the transport system of a city as a 
whole. Some passengers pay more than the cost they impose on the system and this 
surplus allows operators or the authorities to lower the price below costs for other 
services. For example, in many cities transport fares are a flat rate independent of 
distance traveled. In this case and under some conditions, passengers on short trips pay 
more than the cost they generate on the system while passengers on longer trips pay less.   
 
4.4 Examples of the different policy options 
 
Rather than describe each subsidy type in the abstract, in this section we illustrate the 
options available using real world examples of transport subsidies. Figure 2 presents 
selected examples of policies implemented around the world classified according to the 
typology discussed above. Purposely we do not yet evaluate or rank these different 
options. That is left for the following section. 
 
Figure 2: Subsidy typology 
  15Funding Source
Cross-subsidies General Taxation Local or Specific Taxes
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Means tested transfer funded from general taxation  
 
The case of Chile reviewed in Box 1 is an example of a means tested monetary transfer to 
compensate for rising transport costs which is wholly funded from general tax sources. 
Since beneficiaries of this transfer were for the most part individuals receiving some 
other welfare payment, and eligibility for these payments are based on a sophisticated 
means testing procedure, it is reasonable to assume that this is a subsidy where a high 




In the UK, Madrid, Sophia, Mexico City and most other countries, special category of 
passengers travel free or at least at a lower price than the standard fare. This is the case of 
students or young children in most of these cities, the elderly, unemployed or war 
veterans (the later principally in Eastern Europe).  
 
                                                 
17 The targeting instrument used in Chile is an in-depth interview to the household measuring different 
socioeconomic and dwelling characteristics. It is responsibility of each Municipality to undertake these 
interviews. More information on the Chilean targeting system can be found in Gómez-Lobo and Contreras 











Flat fare structure (Nairobi 
and other cities)
Concessionary fares 
(Chile, UK, Mexico City, 
Sophia, other Eastern 
Europe Cities, many 
others)
operators in Buenos Aires)
Tendered rural 
road concesions 
Unconditional operating transfers (USA)
Transport Vouchers ('Vale 
Transporte', Brazil)
Quality differentiated 
subsidies (Bogotá, other 
cities)
Direct transfers using 
welfare system (Chile)
Investment in infrastructure 
(Metro Santiago, many 
others)
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  16Transport vouchers in Brazil 
 
Box 3 presents a summary of the ‘Vale Transporte’ scheme used in Brazil. This demand 
side subsidy is considered somewhat less targeted than the means tested transfer in Chile, 
since the potential beneficiaries are not means tested. However, because of the way the 
system operates, it does generate a self selection of beneficiaries (see Box 3) that 
probably keeps higher income formal workers from benefiting from the scheme. 
Accordingly this system can be classified as a mixture of a categorical subsidy (because it 


































Box 3: The ‘Vale Transporte Scheme in Brazil’ 
 
This demand side subsidy mechanism was introduced in 1985 and works as follows. 
Employers retain 6% of formal workers earnings. In return, these workers receive from their 
employer transport vouchers for the home-to-work and return trips required during a month. 
Employers buy these vouchers at the beginning of the month from a selling agency (can be a 
Bank, a union of transport operators or a municipal or state government agency). Transport 
operators accept these vouchers and trade them in with the issuing agency for money.  
 
Resources spent by firms on Vale Trasporte are tax deductible, thus around 35% of the 
scheme is funded by general tax revenues. The rest is funded by consumers (higher prices), 
workers (lower wages or higher unemployment), or owners (lower profits). The incidence of 
this labor tax needs to be studied further.   
 
One striking characteristic of the Vale Transporte is that it provides an interesting and 
probably effective self-selection targeting mechanism. Workers can opt out of the system, and 
higher income earners have the incentives to do so since 6% of their salaries will generally be 
higher than what they spend on commuting. From 3 minimum wages upwards, public 
transport costs are below 6% of salaries for workers that take one mode of transport to get to 
and from work. Thus, workers with higher incomes will usually opt out of the system, helping 
to reduce leakages to higher income groups. 
 
A substantial number of vouchers are sold by workers in the black market at a discount and 
these workers then walk, cycle or car-pool to work. Although this does not hurt formal 
workers, who still benefit from the scheme, it does point to the potential welfare enhancing 
properties of a direct monetary transfer instead of using voucher that workers later sell at a 
discount in the secondary market.  
 
Gomide, A., S. Leite and J. Rebelo (2004) argue for the direct transfer of benefits to low 
income workers in the informal sector or the unemployed, groups that do not benefit from the 
Vale Transporte scheme. They note that about 50% of workers in Metropolitan Regions of 
Brazil belong to the informal sector and do not benefit from the scheme, a point also raised by 
Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar (2005).  
Source: The World Bank, Internal Urban Transport Mission Report, Annex IV and Gomide, A., 
S. Leite and J. Rebelo (2004) 
 
 
  17Quality self selection 
 
Another type of self selection subsidy scheme occurs when a low quality service is 
subsidized and coexists with a high quality non subsidized service. Presumably, higher 
income individuals prefer to pay for the higher quality service while poorer households 
benefit from the cheaper low quality service. There are many experiences in the world 
that can be classified in this category. One example was found in Bogotá, Colombia 
(prior to Transmilenio reform), where private operators, due to artificially low tariffs set 
by the authorities, did not renovate their rolling stock and the quality of service 
deteriorated. Increasing transport fares to improve the quality of service was not 
politically feasible. Instead a new “executive” service was introduced with new buses but 
at a much higher fare.  
 
The targeting properties of such a subsidy will depend on how precise the quality filter 
operates with respect to socioeconomic level. If many higher income households use the 
low quality service or some poor individuals use the high quality service, then this 
subsidy will not be well targeted.  
 
In some sense a self targeting subsidy based on quality is analogous to subsidies 
operating through rising block tariffs in the utility industries. In both cases, beneficiaries 
are selected based on consumers’ behavior, either by choosing the quantity or quality of 
the good or service consumed. If the experience in the utility industries can be 
extrapolated to the transport sector then one should not be very optimistic regarding the 
targeting properties of these types of subsidies.   
 
 
Flat fare structure 
 
In many transport systems, a flat rate is charged for trips of varying lengths. Since costs 
differ by distance traveled then an implicit cross subsidy is created whereby low cost 
users fund part of the travel cost of high cost users. The rate structure may also imply 
many other cross subsidies. For example, if peak load pricing is not used in the transport 
system, then off-peak users will be cross subsidizing peak users. 
 
Examples include the case of Nairobi, Kenya, where in the 80s a monopoly service 
provider (KBS) used to offer commercially non-viable services in the periphery funded 
by the surplus generated in other parts of the network (Howe and Bryceson, 2000). 
Another case was Barbados before 1980 where a state owned enterprise provided services 
in the whole island for a flat rate regardless of the actual unit cost for service provision 
(Gwilliam, 1996). As we will see below these case are of interest because these fare 
structures became unsustainable following the introduction of competitive transport 
services.  
 
Mexico provides another example of flat fare tariff structures. Except for minibuses, all 
other transport modes (metro, trolley buses, state-owned buses, and the new buses 
operating in a bus rapid transit (BRT) corridor) have a flat tariff (Flynn, 2007). 
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Conditional direct operating subsidies 
 
An operating subsidy with some type of conditionality is the case of buses in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. This experience is described in Box 4. The conditionality in this case is 
due to the fact that subsidy levels are partly dependent on the number of passengers 






























Source: Foster (2005), Krantzer (2005) and Bondorevsky (2007). 
Box 4: Direct transfers to bus operators in Buenos Aires 
 
In Argentina, since the 2002 economic crisis, bus operators receive a direct transfer from the 
government to keep fares low. This subsidy is based on the number of passengers transported, 
the firm’s gross revenues and kilometers supplied. It is funded from a specific tax on diesel 
fuel (bus operators do not pay the tax on diesel oil, which in practice implies an additional 
indirect subsidy). It is interesting to note that the uncertainty regarding the continuity of the 
subsidy (it has been changed 26 times during the first three years it has been applied), affects 
investment incentives. (Krantzer, 2005, Bondorevsky, 2007). 
 
Foster (2005) notes that given the excess capacity in the sector, a better choice might have 
been a demand side subsidy in this case. This would have allowed excess capacity to be 
eliminated in those routes were there is no demand for the service, increasing allocative 
efficiency. However, as noted by Krantzer (2005) the 2001/2002 crisis was so dramatic that 
given the available time frame the only reasonable choice to keep the public transport system 
afloat was to introduce this supply side subsidy. Furthermore, a demand subsidy would have 
been ineffective since only 2 million of the 6 million poor in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
Region would have been targeted had social security programs (such as Plan Jefas y Jefes de 
Hogar) been used as a targeting mechanism. The errors of exclusion would have been very 
high. However, Bondorevsky (2007) shows that the majority of subsidy resources go to 
households in the middle of the income distribution and are thus regressive. Moreover, a 
comparison between 2002 and 2006 indicates that the incidence of subsidies became more 
regressive, as the economic recovery process has led to a relatively more intense use of buses 
by households in the middle of the income distribution. 
 
Fuel tax rebate 
 
In the UK operators receive a rebate on tax paid for fuel by public transport vehicles. 
This subsidy is usually referred to as the Fuel Duty Rebate (FDR) but is now formally 
called the Bus Service Operators Grant (BSOG). This scheme refunds about 80% of taxes 
paid on fuel. One problem with the scheme is that subsidies are not conditioned on 
specific performance targets. In addition, as noted by Carruthers, Dick and Saurkar 
(2005), these subsidies bear no relation to income or poverty. In the DfT (2002) 
consultation, options were presented to modify the FDR in order to target it better to meet 
social, economic and environmental objectives.  
 
  19In Germany, a part of fuel tax revenues is earmarked for public transport improvements 
and local road network investments (ECORYS and NEA, 2004). This is an instance of an 




A very common supply side subsidy occurs when governments fund infrastructure 
investments without users having to pay for this investment through fares. This is the 
general rule for most rail or metro projects and —except for the rare cases where roads 
are tolled— for road infrastructure. Targeting the poor through infrastructure investments 
is bound to be less focalized than demand side alternatives unless the infrastructure 
funded is particularly useful to the poor (such as bicycle routes or walking infrastructure, 
and in general all infrastructure aimed at improving access of the poor to public 
transport). Given the poor targeting characteristics of infrastructure projects, there are 
high risks of leakages to the middle to higher income classes
18. In developing countries, 
where tax systems are usually regressive, this implies subsidies from low income to high 
income households. 
 
Unconditional operating and capital subsidies   
 
The last category considered are subsidies given to operators with scant performance 
conditions. This is often the case with deficit prone public transport operators. Annual 
projected deficits are covered by government transfers. However, operating subsidies can 
also be given to private operators. 
 
As mentioned earlier, urban transport systems in the US were and still are heavily 
subsidized. According to Pucher, Markstedt and Hirschman (1983) these subsidies were 
not made contingent on performance standards, productivity growth, cost containment, 
ridership targets or other social, economic or environmental goals. Thus it is not 
surprising to find ample evidence that subsidies raised costs. According to Obeng, Azam 
and Sakano (1997) urban transport subsidies in the US are partially funded by dedicated 
local taxes on property, utility, fuel and sale taxes. In 1989, 17.5% of total transit 
revenues came from these sources. However, some federal funding is also available.    
 
5. CRITERIA AND TRADE-OFFS FOR CHOOSING SUBSIDIES 
 
Until this point, we have abstained from making normative judgment regarding the 
different subsidy schemes applied in practice or the options available. In this section we 
discuss different criteria by which these affordability policies should be evaluated. We 
also discuss the trade-offs involved. Through this discussion we hope to delineate what 
may be considered as best practice in this field.    
 
                                                 
18 For example, in Washington DC, USA, the profile of metro users shows that 73% of users have annual 
household income of US$75,000 or more, while for buses, the share is only 34% (Ginsberg and Stanton, 
2007). 
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Naturally, an important consideration relating to subsidies motivated by social or 
distributive reasons is whether or not they are capable of delivering the pro poor impact 
that justify them in the first place, if that was the policy objective. In the following 
sections of this paper we will discuss how to measure the distributive impacts of 
subsidies and some of the available empirical evidence.  
 
Although the targeting of subsidies is an empirical matter that must be addressed on a 
case by case basis, there are reasons to expect that certain subsides work better than 
others in this respect. Supply side subsidies will usually be poorly targeted since they do 
not discriminate different types of users. In part, this is due to the fact that many supply 
side subsidies operate as a general price reduction. Thus, eligibility and the amount of 
subsidies received are based on the consumption of the good or service in question. When 
there are many poor households who do not use a subsidized service or when 
consumption of the service increases with income, the subsidy benefits will not be 
particularly targeted to poor households.    
 
As shown further below, the empirical evidence confirms for the most part that supply 
side subsidies are not particularly pro-poor. Demand side subsidies have a higher 
targeting potential if some type of effective eligibility criteria is used to screen poor and 
non-poor households. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that such a screening 
mechanism will be well targeted. For example, geographically targeted utility subsidies 
in Colombia are not well focalized, in spite of the fact that the central government gives 
very careful instruction to each Municipality on how to determine the socioeconomic 
category of each dwelling (Gómez-Lobo and Contreras, 2003). A case in the urban 
transport sector is Mexico City, where Metro riders tend to belong to middle income 
families, due to its location in mostly middle income areas of the City. In parallel, many 
low income Metro riders are forced to pay double to transfer from another system to 
access Metro. In the case of the later, they benefit from the subsidy to ride Metro, but the 
whole trip becomes significantly more expensive in the absence of tariff integration.  
 
The evidence for categorical subsidies is not very good either. In Madrid, Spain, 
preferential fares for groups such as the elderly or the young are not related to income 
(Vassallo and Villar, 2007). In Sofia, Bulgaria, access to preferential passes is to some 
extent correlated with income, but the targeting properties can not be considered 
satisfactory (ECORYS and NEA, 2004). In Santiago, Chile, student preferential fares are 
progressive, but the cross subsidy used to fund them are regressive. The balance is a 
neutral impact (for details see Gomez Lobo 2007a). 
 
Overall we can safely conclude that targeting subsidies to reach the poor is very difficult 
and perfect or near perfect targeting is impossible. Therefore, as in most other economic 
settings, all available alternatives for the transport sector will be imperfect and the 
challenge is to choose the design option that is “best suboptimal” in relative terms not in 
absolute terms. This in turn requires some numerical simulation in order to compare 
possible design options.   
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5.2 Productive efficiency 
 
Beyond the distributional impact, an important consideration when evaluating subsidies 
is the effect that a given policy may have on the productive efficiency of operators.  
 
There is ample evidence that supply side unconditional subsidies reduce productive 
efficiency. In the United States Obeng, Azam and Sakano (1997) show that transit 
subsidies to operators distort input use and increase costs, especially for smaller firms 
(less than 500 vehicles). More recently, Obeng and Sakano (2000) show that capital and 
operating subsidies to transit firm in the US do affect input use and thus affect 
productivity and the costs of these firms. They find that capital subsidies increase 
technical change while operating subsidies reduce technical change. However, the net 
effect of subsidies on technical change was negative. They find that operating subsidies 
promote the use of more labor and fuel than would be optimal, and that capital subsidies 
do not wholly compensate for this effect. They also show that in the aggregate transit 
firms do not minimize cost as a result of the incentives of the subsidy structure.  
 
Supply side subsidies could have other negative effects. They can lead to the provision of 
excessive quality of service through excessive frequencies, a level of comfort that is too 
expensive for the system (air conditioning, carpet floors) and permanence of an 
inefficient routing design. Lowering fares may be an appropriate way to make sure 
subsidies are not dissipated in the form of excessive service (Else, 1985). 
 
Therefore, care must be taken when designing supply side subsidies. Benefits must be 
tied to productivity and performance conditions to avoid efficiency problems. The use of 
specific tendered contracts is an interesting alternative. By forcing operators to compete 
for contracts reduces the efficiency problems that supply side subsidies may create. Still, 
the arguments provided would indicate that demand side subsidies are preferable to 
supply side subsidies. 
 
5.3 Equity, effectiveness and efficiency of the funding mechanism 
 
As argued by Proost (2001) the financing side of a subsidy is important. This relates not 
only to the distributive impact of the funding mechanism, but also to the economic 
efficiency of the tax and the possible perverse incentives it may create.  
 
As for efficiency, all taxes generate a deadweight loss on the economic (this is known as 
the cost of public funds). Ideally, funding should be raised using those mechanisms with 
the lowest deadweight loss. Although it not possible to generalize, usually local and 
specific taxes will generate a greater deadweight loss per revenue compared to income or 
general consumption taxes (such as the value added tax). This is due to the smaller tax 
based of local taxes. Cross subsidy financing is probably even less efficient.   
 
Cross subsidies also encourage cream skimming of the profitable market niche, which 
may generate inefficient entry into the system and make the operations of the incumbent 
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(Gwilliam, 1996). The Barbados Transport Board (BTB) was responsible for providing 
services in the whole island at the same fare. During the eighties, and minibuses where 
licensed to operate. The new vehicles operated the shorter more profitable routes, and 
between 1980 and 1984 took away 33% of BTB’s patronage. During the following years, 
BTB demand continued falling by 3% a year. Besides the financial losses this has 
generated to BTB, many of the shorter routes are served by vehicles with higher unit 
costs compared to the BTB fleet. Thus, the flat rate system generated inefficient entry and 
compromised the financial viability of BTB. Something very similar happened in 
Nairobi, Kenya, where competition by another bus company and shared taxis forced the 
main service provider (KBS) to rebalance tariffs, thus eliminating cross subsidies to 
peripheral areas (Howe and Bryceson, 2000). Cross subsidies are not sustainable under 
competition.  
  
Incentive issues are also important. When subsidies are funded from cross subsidies, 
operators may not have an incentive to provide service to low fare groups. For example, 
in Wuhan, China, poor people are eligible for a card which qualifies them for lowered 
price public transport. Senior citizens and the disabled have a similar card which gives 
them the right to free transport. However, operators avoid taking on these passengers, or 
do not recognize the preferential fare allowed for these groups, reducing considerably the 
effectiveness of this type of subsidy (Shuiying, Han, Weili and Dening, 2003). Something 
similar occurred with the student fare pass in Santiago, Chile (before the implementation 
of Transantiago). Operators avoid taking on student passengers, especially during peak 
hours. Still another example is in Kingston, Jamaica, where operators do not always 
honor the obligation to carry schoolchildren at the established concessionary rate 
(Gwilliam, 1996)  
 
Finally, cross subsidies are often opaque. It is not clear who is paying for the subsidy and 
how much, nor which are the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries. This lack of 
transparency does not improve the targeting properties or the efficiency of a transport 
subsidy.  
 
5.4 Administrative costs 
 
Another consideration for the design of subsidies is the administrative costs. In general, a 
supply side subsidy will be cheaper to implement, since there are less agents involved 
and no screening mechanisms need to be setup. However, as discussed above they are 
also the worst targeted and they may generate inefficiencies reducing the benefits 
received by final users of the service.  
 
The administrative costs for geographical subsidies are also low, but the targeting 
properties will depend on the geographical concentration of different social groups. 
Categorical subsidies probably also have low administrative costs, although some type of 
card or credential will be required. Therefore, there will be costs associated with the 
generation and distribution of these cards, as well as in screening potential beneficiaries 
and controlling fraud. 
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Arguably, means testing is the most expensive targeting mechanism. Some type of 
screening mechanism must be devised and applied. It probably does not make sense to set 
up such a mechanism just for one subsidy, say a transport subsidy. Therefore, the 
application of this targeting method will depend on the mechanisms already in place in a 
given country. There are strong economies of scope in this area, in the sense that if the 
same mechanism is used to target many different government subsidies then the cost can 
be quite low.  
 
5.5 Transparency, reversible policies and fiscal sustainability 
 
There are also some other issues that need to be considered when evaluating a subsidy 
design. Transparency is a positive and desirable characteristic. Knowing exactly who gets 
the benefits and who pays will reduce the rent-seeking behavior by some non-poor 
groups to capture the available resources. Ideally subsidies should be reversible, in the 
sense that they can be discontinued once the original justification is no longer relevant. 
This would tend to favor sporadic direct compensatory payments, as in Chile, instead of 
regular continuous supply or demand subsidies which once introduced are very difficult 
to remove. 
 
The fiscal cost of a subsidy scheme needs to be carefully considered. Agencies in charge 
of the administration of a subsidy should prepare frequent reports detailing the total 
amount of resources devoted to it and where they come from. This issue is related to the 
distributive incidence issue. For a limited budget, the better the targeting properties of a 
subsidy the higher will be the impact on poor people. However, no subsidy can be 
perfectly targeted and consequently some deserving households will not receive any 
benefit, no matter how well designed the targeting mechanism used. The point is that to 
reach all deserving households, one must be willing to tolerate high leakages to non-
deserving households. This can be very expensive. Therefore, there will often be a trade-
off between the targeting properties of a subsidy and the fiscal expenditure required. 




6. HOW SHOULD AFFORDABILITY POLICIES BE ANALYZED IN URBAN TRANSPORT? 
 
It is crucial to evaluate the distributive impacts of subsidies in order to evaluate whether 
they are effectively meeting their social and distributive objective. To this end, in this 
section we discuss some methodological issues relating to the empirical estimation of 
these impacts.
20 The proposed methodology can then be used to evaluate different 
existing transport affordability measures and to guide policy makers in making informed 
                                                 
19 These issues are discussed in Gómez-Lobo and Contreras (2003) for the case of water subsidies in 
Colombia and Chile. 
20 Gómez-Lobo (2007b) is recommended for the reader interested in the technical details of a welfare 
approach to measure the impact of affordability policies, including applications to the transport sector and a 
discussion of possible alternatives when the scarcity of information precludes the use of the methodological 
approach presented in this paper. 
  24judgments on reforms in this area. Applied cases of subsidies and their distributive 
incidence are presented in Section 7. 
 
The ideas presented in this section are well developed in the welfare economics and 
income distribution literature, but have not been applied to the transport sector It is hoped 
that this section will clarify the microeconomic basis for many of the approaches used to 
evaluate subsidy policies and discuss the most useful ways to present the available 
information. 
 
From a practical point of view, detailed information on household travel patterns and 
socioeconomic characteristics is ideally required in order to apply the methodology 
proposed. While in many cases a household survey and mobility study will be available 
for a given city, in others, especially in developing countries where data collection efforts 
are less frequent, the information available will be sparser or outdated. 
 
This paper presents an approach consistent with the income distribution literature, and 
already applied to utility and transport subsidies by Foster (2005), among others. The 
distributive implications of affordability policies are analyzed by graphing the Lorenz 
curve or relative benefit curve.  
 
The relative benefit distribution curve (or Lorenz curve) graphs the percentage of a 
subsidy accruing to the first nth rank of households, according to some measure of 
income, expenditure or wealth distribution. More formally, the graph of a relative 















where h denotes the jth ranked household from the lowest to the highest, r(j) is the value 
of the graph at the household ranked j, sh is the benefit accruing to household h and S is 
the total benefit distributed by the policy. Figure 3 gives an example where two curves 
are graphed. The curve above the 45º line shows a progressive distribution of benefits, 
since K% of poorest households receive more than K% of the total benefits whatever 
value of K is chosen. The curve below the 45º line shows a regressive distribution of 
benefits since poorer households now receive less than a proportional amount of the 
benefit. 
  25Figure 3: Progressive vs. Regressive distribution 
 













































The relative benefit curve is a very useful tool when comparing the distributive impact of 
different policies since it gives a graphical representation of the relative incidence of 
benefits. When the curves for different policy interventions are superimposed on the 
graph it will often be possible to rank them according to their distributive impact. This 
will be the case when the different curves do not cross each other, in which case the 
highest curve will dominate the others in terms of progressiveness.  
 
Associated with the relative distribution curve is the Quasi-Gini coefficient which gives a 
summary measurement of the progressive or regressive nature of the policy in question. 
This coefficient is calculated as the area between the 45º line and the distribution curve 
(with a negative value when the curve is above the 45º line) over the area below the 45º 
line. This is illustrated in Figure 4. The closer the Quasi-Gini coefficient is to -1 the more 
progressive is the distribution of impacts. 
 
































Households ordered from poorest to richest
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The Quasi-Gini coefficient will also allow an unambiguous ranking to be made of the 
different policies if their associated distribution curves do not intersect. When these 
curves intersect then the Quasi-Gini coefficient may not rank policies correctly. For 
example, the relative benefit curves shown on Figure 5 could have the same Quasi-Gini 
coefficient, but the first curve shows a higher proportion of benefits to the lowest 10% of 
households, while the second curve is less generous to this group but more to households 
in the second and third deciles of the income (wealth or expenditure) distribution. The 
Quasi-Gini coefficient, being a summary statistic, does not show this last point. Thus, the 
relative value attached to the welfare of the poorest among the poor may be important 
when evaluating the merits of different policies. Therefore, in some cases graphing the 
relative distribution curves will be preferable to just reporting the associated Quasi-Gini 
coefficients.  
 
Figure 5: An application of Quasi-Gini coefficients 
           




























Households ordered from poorest to richest
 
Besides the Quasi-Gini coefficient, another summary measure of the distributive 
incidence of a subsidy is the percentage of the subsidy accruing to poor households over 
the percentage of the population represented by poor households. This is the Ω value used 
in Komives, et al (2005) and is presented in Figure 6. This approach requires the analyst 
to define the set of poor households beforehand. For example, in Figure 6 it is assumed 
that poor households are the poorest 40% of the population. The Ω value will be the 
percentage of the total subsidy accruing to this group, which is read from the relative 
distribution curve, divided by 40%. It will be above 1 for a progressive subsidy and 
below 1 for a regressive one.   
 
 
  27Figure 6: Ω value assuming 40% as poorest HH 
Ω = A / B 


































Another approach to measure the distributional impact of policies —and complementary 
to the relative benefit curves— is the estimation of the errors of exclusion and inclusion. 
The error of exclusion of a subsidy is the percentage of the target population of the policy 
(poor households) who do not receive any benefit. The error of inclusion is the 
percentage of benefiting households who should not be receiving this benefit (do not 
belong to the target population) and represents the leakage of resources of the policy to 
non deserving households.  
 
Figure 7, taken from Foster (2005), illustrates these concepts graphically. The population 
is first divided between poor (P) and non-poor households (NP) and beneficiaries (that is 
households that receive the subsidy) are divided between those who should receive the 
benefit due to their poverty condition (PB) and those who should not receive it (NPB). 
The errors of inclusion are the non-poor who receive the benefit (NPB) over all 
beneficiaries of the policy (PB+NPB). The errors of exclusion are the poor who do not 
receive any benefit (P – PB) over the total number of poor households (P).  
 
To calculate the errors of inclusion and exclusion households must first be classified as 
poor and non-poor. Usually this is done by defining households in the first few quintiles 
of the income distribution as poor. However, this is somewhat arbitrary. An interesting 
alternative is to present the information graphically so that these errors can be determined 
for whatever poverty line the analyst wishes to use.  
  28Figure 7: Errors of inclusion and exclusion 





Errors of  inclusion = 
NPB / (PB + NPB)
Errors of exclusion = 
(P – PB) /P
 
 
To explain this approach we must introduce another graph, the absolute beneficiary 












where Ih is an indicator function that takes a value of one if household h receives the 
benefit under analysis and zero otherwise and N is the total number of households in the 
population. The errors of exclusion and inclusion can be determined easily from the 
cumulative beneficiary curve as explained in Gómez-Lobo and Contreras (2003) and in 
Figure 8 and 9. The horizontal axis ranks households from poorest to richest, as in the 
relative benefit curve, but the vertical axis now measures percentages of the population. 
The curve will cross the right vertical axis at a point equal to the percentage of the 
population receiving a subsidy.  
 
As an illustration, assume in the graph that the poor are considered to be households in 
the first two quintiles of the income distribution. Then, a perfectly targeted subsidy will 
imply that the percentage of the population benefiting from the policy will be equal to 
40% of the population and that all beneficiaries belong to the first two deciles of the 
population. That is, the cumulative beneficiary curve will be a line along the 45º line up 
to the 40th ranked household and horizontal thereafter.  
 
 
  29Figure 8: Targeting – Cumulative curves 
































Figure 9 shows how to read off the errors of exclusion and inclusion from the cumulative 
beneficiary curve. The error of inclusion is equal to the proportional difference between 
the point where the effective cumulative beneficiary curve cuts the right axis and the 
projected point on the right axis where the cumulative beneficiary curves cuts the poverty 
line definition. Likewise, the errors of exclusion can be read off the graph as the 
proportional difference between the point where the poverty line cuts the 45º line and the 
point where it cuts the cumulative beneficiary curve.  
 
Figure 9: Errors of Exclusion and Inclusion 





























Errors of Exclusion =
A / (A+B)




  30The advantage of using this graph instead of calculating the errors of exclusion and 
inclusion directly is that one does not have to define beforehand who is and who is not in 
the target population. By presenting this information in graphical form one can read the 
errors of exclusion and inclusion for different definitions of the target population (e.g. 
households in the first two deciles of the income distribution or perhaps households in the 
first four deciles of the income distribution).  
 
In summary, when studying the distributive impacts of policies it is preferable to present 
the relative benefit and cumulative beneficiary curves. Complementary to these graphs, it 
is recommended that some summary statistics, such as the Quasi-Gini coefficient and the 
errors of inclusion and exclusion for a given definition of the target population also be 
presented.  
 
7. WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SAY? 
 
Up to this point the discussion has been for the most part conceptual. In this section we 
review the empirical evidence available regarding the performance of different transport 
subsidy schemes. However, we first present a review of the lessons learned from 
subsidies in the utility sectors. This review will help to put the evidence from the 
transport sector in perspective.  
 
7.1 Lessons from the utility sectors 
 
Most of the arguments justifying affordability measures in transport are relevant for 
utility services. As in transport, utility subsidies are ubiquitous. A review of the literature 
shows there are many studies that analyze the distributive impact of subsidies in utilities, 
while very few case studies can be found for the transport sector. Therefore, it is 
important to draw the main lessons from the utilities case studies. In this section we 
summarize the results and lessons from a comprehensive international study of electricity 
and water subsidies undertaken by Komives, Foster, Halpern and Wodon (2005), 
although many other studies are consistent with their results.
21 The lessons are the 
following: 
 
1) Quantity targeted subsidies in the utility sector are for the most part regressive  
 
Quantity based subsidies are distributed according to the consumption characteristics of 
the good or service in question. For example, a universal subsidy that decreases the price 
of electricity or water across all users and for all consumption levels is a quantity based 
subsidy. The amount of the subsidy received will depend on the units of the good 
consumed. More sophisticated consumption based subsidies are increasing block tariffs 
(IBT) or volume differentiated tariffs (VDT). The analogy with the transport sector is a 
subsidy that lowers transport fares across the board as with most supply side subsidies or 
untargeted demand subsidies. 
 
                                                 
21 See for example The World Bank (2000; 2002) and Foster and Araujo (2004) just to cite three examples.  
  31Table 2 presents the results of Komives, et al (2005) in relation to these types of 
subsidies. Besides the errors of exclusion, the table presents the Ω parameter introduced 
in Section 6. It represents the percentage of total benefits accruing to the poor divided by 
the percentage of the poor in the general population. This parameter will be above 1 when 
the subsidy has a progressive impact on the income distribution and a value below 1 
when its impact is regressive. 
 
It can be seen from the table that out of the 25 real world subsidies analyzed not one of 
them was distributed progressively. In all cases —except in Gujarat India where the 
subsidy had a neutral impact on the income distribution— benefits accrued proportionally 
more to the non-poor than to the poor. This implies that the poor would be made better 
off if these subsidy were eliminated and the financial resources thus liberated were 
distributed randomly across the population.   
 
Table 2: Distributive impact of different quantity based subsidies in the electricity 
and water sectors 
Country, city  Type of subsidy  Ω  Error of exclusion 
Electricity cases:       
Guatemala VDT  0.20  55.4 
Honduras VDT  0.49  56.0 
Peru IBT  0.82  59.9 
Cape Verde  IBT  0.48  75.6 
Sao Tome and Principe  IBT  0.41  76.8 
India: average  IBT  0.70  21.0 
India, Kerala  IBT  0.65  14.5 
India, Andhra Pradesh  IBT  0.78  16.4 
India, Tamil Nadu  IBT  0.53  15.3 
India, Karnataka  IBT  0.74  18.6 
India, Maharashtra  IBT  0.66  13.8 
India, Madhya Pradesh  IBT  0.70  12.4 
India, Gujarat  IBT  1.00  21.6 
India, Orissa  IBT  0.71  40.1 
India, Punjab  IBT  0.91  13.4 
India, Haryana  IBT  0.66  15.4 
India, Rajasthan  IBT  0.84  20.7 
India, Delhi  IBT  0.57  9.1 
India, Uttar Pradesh  IBT  0.66  25.8 
India, West Bengal  IBT  0.62  30.5 
India, Bihar  IBT  0.43  47.7 
Water cases:       
Nepal, Katmandú  IBT  0.56  53.0 
India, Bangalore  IBT  0.66  60.5 
Sri Lanka  IBT  0.83  69.5 
Cape Verde  IBT  0.24  89.7 
Source: Table 5.1, Komives, et al (2005). 
Note: Real subsidies reported. Simulated cases not shown.  
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The evidence seems to indicate that quantity based subsidies are a failure from a 
distributive point of view. There are several reasons for this negative result. The most 
important is related to lack of access, that is, many poor households are not connected to 
these services and thus are unable to benefit from subsidies based on the consumption of 
these goods. It is important to keep this point in mind when discussing the targeting 
properties of transport subsidies since something analogous can occur if poor households 
do not use public transport intensively (they walk, for example) or simply can not use 
transportation services due to the location of the household beyond the catchment area of 
the system. 
 
A second reason why these subsidies do not seem to work is that there is a large variance 
in consumption of utility services among household with the same socioeconomic level. 
This implies that a rising block tariff that tries to target subsidies based on the 
consumption level of the household will usually not work. There will be just as many 
non-poor households as poor households consuming in the low priced block as in the 
high priced block.    
 
2) Targeting efforts improve the distributive impact of subsidies but only means testing 
has a significant positive impact 
 
A second lesson is that the targeting performance of subsidies increases if some effort is 
made to target them to specific users. However, significant progressive distributional 
impacts are achieved only when beneficiaries are means tested for socioeconomic 
conditions.    
 
Table 3 shows the performance of water and electricity subsidies where some effort is 
made to target benefits. Geographical targeting improves the distributive impact over 
quantity based subsidies. However, they are only mildly progressive and almost neutral in 
their impact on the income distribution (Ω close to 1). 
 
Means testing performs much better in terms of the distributive impact of subsidies. This 
implies that most of the resources transferred accrue to the target population, minimizing 
errors of inclusion. Nevertheless, the errors of exclusion are quite high, showing the trade 
off between targeting performance and coverage of the subsidy. It is highly probable that 
the high errors of exclusion are due to the limited budgetary allowances of the programs. 
At least this seems to be the case in Chile. Consistent with the results of  Komives, et al 
(2005) shown above, Gómez-Lobo and Contreras (2003) find that for the amount of 
resources spent, the means tested Chilean water subsidy was better targeted than the 
geographically based subsidy used in Colombia. However, the errors of exclusion were 
much higher in Chile than in Colombia. The main message from these results is that 
targeting the poor is difficult and if the policy maker wants to cover all of the target 
population, she needs to be willing to have high errors of inclusion, which implies 
spending considerable amount of resources in the program.  
 
 
  333) Subsidy design could be improved but only up to a certain limit 
 
Another important result from studies such as Komives, et al (2005) is that there is a limit 
to the targeting improvement that can be achieved by improving the design of quantity 
based subsidies. Their simulations show that the improvements in the distributional 
impacts of some of the subsidies shown in Table 2 would increase only marginally if the 
design was improved. For our purposes, it is interesting to analyze the reasons for this 
last result. The main problem seems to be the access problem. If a significant proportion 
of poor users are not connected to the service (i.e. do not use public transport services or 
are not within the catchment area of the transport service), then any subsidy distributed 
through the price of the service is not going to be progressive.  
 
Table 3: Distributive impact of different subsidies where some administrative 
selection of beneficiaries is made 
Country, city  Type of subsidy  Ω  Error of 
exclusion 
Geographic targeting       
Electricity cases:       
Colombia, Bogotá  Geographically defined tariffs with IBT  1.10  3.7 
Mexico Geographically  defined tariffs with IBT  0.60  n/r 
Water cases:       
Nicaragua, Managua  IBT plus slum discount  1.18  5.0 
Venezuela, Merida  BT plus slum discount  1.09  0.0 
Colombia, Bogotá  Geographically defined tariffs with IBT  1.09  1.9 
      
Means testing:       
Electricity cases:       
Argentina  Average of provincial jeans-tested 
subsidy  1.50 94.0 
Georgia, Tbilisi  Limited free allowance of electricity for 
targeted households  1.20 75.0 
Water cases:      
Argentina  Average of provincial jeans-tested 
subsidy  1.23 76.0 
Chile  Discounts of 40-70% on 15m3 for 
targeted households  1.63 78.0 
Paraguay, urban 
Discount on 15 m3 for targeted 
households (means test based on 
housing characteristics) 
1.64 93.1 
Source: Table 6.3, Komives, et al (2005). 
Note: Real subsidies reported. Simulated cases not shown.  
 
7.2 Evidence from the transport sector 
 
The distributive performance of transport subsidies has been scarcely researched, 
marking a stark contrast with the electricity and water sectors. This paper summarizes the 
  34available evidence on the incidence of transport subsidies and relies on new evidence 
provided by case studies of the cities Santiago de Chile, Mumbai, Mexico City, Buenos 
Aires and Madrid prepared for a World Bank research project and completed in 2007. 
The evidence seems to point in the same direction as that found in the utility sectors, 
namely that affordability measures are usually badly targeted. In addition, the fact that in 
many cases poor people are priced out of public transport creates the same “access” 




Box 3 reviewed the transport voucher program in that country (‘vale transporte’). 
Gomide, A., S. Leite and J. Rebelo (2004) note that about 50% of workers in 
Metropolitan Regions of Brazil belong to the informal sector and do not benefit from the 
scheme.Therefore, it seems that the error of exclusion for this subsidy is quite high. Since 
informal workers will most probably earn less than formal workers, it is highly likely that 




The preferential fares for students, the elderly and others are an example of categorical 
subsidies. In the case of Sofia, ECORYS and NEA (2004) show that the distribution of 
preferential passes were not well related to income, as the following table shows. 
Although access to preferential passes is to some extent correlated with income, 
especially for households, the targeting properties are not satisfactory.  In addition, these 
results do not show the impact of the funding side of the subsidy, which could be 
regressive if it is funded through cross subsidies. 
 
















  All household members  Workers 
Low 28%  72%  100%  3% 97%  100% 
Medium  14% 86%  100%  14% 86%  100% 
High  4% 96%  100%  8% 92%  100% 
Source: Table 3.5 from ECORYS and NEA (2004). 
Note: In Sofia 18% of trips are made with preferential passes. 
 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 
Foster (2005) and Bondorevsky (2007) analyzed three transport subsidies in the Greater 
Buenos Aires area. These included the operating subsidy for the metro (SUBTE) and sub-
urban rail (AMBA) as well as the subsidy introduced in 2002 for buses (‘Colectivos’) 
reviewed in Box 4. These are all examples of supply side subsidies where scant efforts 
are made to target benefits to poor households. 
 
  35The results show that in all cases these subsidies are regressive. Moreover, when a 
comparison is made between 2002 and 2006, it is clear that subsidies are becoming more 
regressive (Figures 10 and 11). Besides, as shown in Figure 12, errors of inclusion 
increased significantly, another indication of the failures associated with supply side 
subsidies. Overall, the analysis shows that share of subsidies accruing to the middle and 
high income households is increasing. The estimated Quasi-Gini coefficients for each 
subsidy in 2006 was 0.06 for AMBA, 0.2 for Colectivos, and 0.48 for SUBTE).  
 
Figures 10 and 11: Distributive incidence of transport subsidies                                      







































































Bus Metro Train Neutral distribution  
Source: Bondorevsky (2007). 
 
 
Figures 12 and 13: Errors of exclusion and inclusion of transport subsidies in 
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A recent case study by Flynn (2007) shows that, contrary to popular beliefs, transport 
subsidies in Mexico city are not particularly pro-poor. Table 5 shows some of the 
distributive parameters of the different subsidies considered, as well as an estimate of the 
Ω coefficient based on the information presented in that study.  
  36Table 5: distributive impacts of different supply side subsidies in Mexico City 
Subsidy Distributive 
impact (Ω) 
Error of inclusion 
 
Error of exclusion 
Metro 1.00  52%  68% 
RTP (Buses)  1.14  45%  68% 
STE (Trolleys)  0.96  54%  68% 
Source: Flynn (2007). 
 
The three subsidies analyzed by Flynn (2007) are supply side subsidies and with the 
exception of the RTP subsidy —which is mildly progressive— these subsidies are neutral 
in terms of their distributive impact. The high errors of exclusion point to the relatively 
low use of these transport modes by the poor. In fact, the ‘colectivos’ (small buses) are 





Another recent study for Santiago, Chile, shows similar results (Gómez-Lobo, 2007) 
regarding supply side subsidies and some types of demand subsidies. Table 6 presents the 
results for different subsidy policies.
22  
 
Table 6: Distributional impacts of transport subsidies in Santiago, Chile 
Subsidy Quasi-Gini   
coefficient 













0.27 77.7%  88.7% 
Direct transfer  -0.34  36.5%  51.6% 
Source: Gómez-Lobo (2007a). 
 
The student preferential fares in buses and metro are funded through cross subsidies. 
Thus the distributive impact of these policies must be analyzed both from the benefit and 
the funding side. In the case of buses, the distribution of benefits is mildly progressive. 
However, the funding of the subsidy is also mildly “progressive” in the sense that poorer 
households pay a disproportionate amount of the tax needed to fund the subsidy. These 
counteracting effects almost cancel each other out, making this categorical subsidy 
basically neutral. As discussed in Gómez-Lobo (2007a), this subsidy takes money from 
poor and rich households without student members and gives it to rich and poor 
households alike that have student members. In fact, 70% of poor households do not 
receive any benefit from this scheme. 
 
                                                 
22 These results were obtained using data prior to the Transantiago reform of 2005-2007. Thus, they may 
not be representative of the current situation in Santiago. 
  37The student preferential fare for Metro is regressive both on the benefit and the funding 
side, implying almost a neutral impact although the net effect is somewhat progressive. 
However, judging by the error of exclusion of this subsidy it can be seen that very few 
poor households gain from it. 
 
The only policy with a positive distributive impact is the direct monetary transfers 
implemented in 2004, 2005 and 2006 described in Box 1. This policy was much more 





A case study of Mumbai, India, shows similar results for supply side subsidies (Cropper, 
2007). Two supply side subsidies are analyzed in that study, one to cover operating losses 
for bus services (representing around 30% of fares) and another for rail services (a small 
shortfall of 2% of costs). The incidence of these subsidies is presented in Table 7. This 
table presents the cumulative percentage of the population by income groups and the 
cumulative percentage of total subsidies accruing to each group. It is simply a tabulated 
representation of the relative beneficiary curve. The final column presents the Ω 
coefficient for two different definitions of the poverty line; one assumes poverty is 
defined to include households earning less than 5K (27% of households) and the other 
assumes it includes households earning less than 7.5K per month (54.4% of households).  
 
Table 7: Subsidy incidence in Mumbai, India 











<5K  26.6 19.1 15.5  0.72  /  0.81 
5001-7500  54.4 44.9 38.0  0.83  /  0.85 
7501-10000  76.3 68.0 61.8   
10001-20000  94.1 92.2 88.3   
>20K  100.0 100.0 100.0   
Source: own calculations based on Cropper (2007) 
 
The results show that these subsidies are not pro-poor. More than a proportional amount 
of the subsidy accrues to middle and higher income households. The errors of inclusion, 
shown in Table 8 are quite high, while the errors of exclusion are quite low. This is 
typical of universal subsidies that benefit rich and poor alike. 
 
Table 8: Errors of inclusion and exclusion, Mumbai, India 
Subsidy  Errors of exclusion  Errors of inclusion 
Bus   10.0  92.6 
Rail 26.1  86.2 
Source: Cropper (2007) 
 
 
  387.3 Can transport subsidies do better? 
 
With the exception of the means tested direct transfer implemented in Chile, all transport 
subsidies reviewed show either a neutral or regressive distributive impact. Thus, these 
policies are not doing much for the poor.
23 We have also seen that this is not particularly 
unique to the transport sector; most subsidies in the electricity and water sectors have the 
same neutral or negative impacts.  
 
Can transport subsidies do better? This is an empirical matter that needs to be studied 
further. Quantitative simulations would probably help in reforming policies to improve 
their targeting properties. However, there is probably a limit to how progressive subsidies 
can be when policies are designed and executed within the narrow confines of the 
transport sector. This will happen for the same reasons that sectoral subsidies do not seem 
to function well in the utility sectors; first, because of the ‘access problem’ and, second, 
because there is too much variance in consumption levels for a subsidy based in 
consumption to discriminate well between poor and non-poor households. 
 
One of the main obstacles to improve the performance of utility subsidies is the access 
problem; a significant group of poor people are not connected to these services and thus 
cannot benefit from utility price subsidies. The analogy of the ‘access problem’ in the 
transport sector is the prevalence of walking among the poor due to a lack of affordable 
fares for services that, if affordable, would be used by the poor.  
 
Table 9: Walking as a percentage of all trips 
 Poor  Non-Poor Source 
Mumbai, Indiaa  63%  45%  Cropper (2007) 
Nairobi, Kenyab  57%  24%  Howe and Bryceson (2000) 
Conakry, Guinea  78%  61%  SITRASS (2004a) 
Douala, Cameroon  77%  52%  SITRASS (2004b) 
Notes: a work trips, b percentage refers to the first trip (usually work related) reported.   
 
Table 9 presents some evidence on the mode split between poor and non-poor households 
as regards walking. It is clear that poor individuals walk much more than non-poor 
households. Thus, subsidies that operate through public transit fares do not reduce the out 
of pocket cost of the mode chosen by many poor people, and a significant amount of 
benefits will accrue to higher income households.  
 
One of the main reasons why transport affordability measures are adopted is to allow 
poor households to change the travel mode, shifting from walking to using motorized 
public transport. Thus, it could be argued that more subsidies are required so that the 
worse off in society can take public transport instead of walking. However, it is likely 
that fare reductions will only have a modest impact on modal split and most of the effort 
                                                 
23 In addition, it must be borne in mind that urban transport subsidies do not benefit rural areas, where 
poverty is usually more intense and widespread. 
 
  39will be wasted subsidizing non deserving households.
24 Focalizing subsidies directly to 
the poor or using these funds to improve access infrastructure (as it is usually the case 
that the poor households are located in places with difficult and costly access to 
motorized public transport) or walking infrastructure would be more helpful to needy 
households.  
 
Even when the poor do use public transport, the economic characteristics of this service 
do not necessarily make it a good candidate to distribute benefits. As discussed by 
Alderman (2002), to distribute transfers in kind or through a price subsidy, the good in 
question should ideally be an inferior good (consumption decreases with a rise in income) 
or at least a strong necessity (consumption increases with income but less than 
proportionally). Subsidizing inferior or necessity goods generates self-selection of 
beneficiaries since higher households consume much less of the good than low income 
households.  
 
Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that public transport tends to be a luxury 
(consumption increases more than proportional to increases in income) or a weak 
necessity, at least for low levels of income. The data presented in Table 10 gives an 
example from Ukraine (urban households) showing that public transport is a luxury good 
up to the highest income category.  
 
It is usually the case that, in many developing countries, the relation between public 
transport expenditure and income has an inverted U shape, as is shown in Figure 1. This 
implies that the self-selection mechanism discussed above will not operate well in the 
transport sector or at least not as well as with other goods. Subsidies transferred through 
untargeted fare reductions will benefit the poor but will also benefit many middle to high 
income households, making it, in most cases, a regressive subsidy.  
 
Table 10: Expenditure on public transport per income group 
Ukraine (urban households) 






> 20000  2.6% 
Sources: NEA and ECORYS (2004) and Godard and Diaz Olivera (2000). 
 
This structural characteristic may distinguish developing countries from developed 
countries. As income increases and private automobile ownership becomes more 
widespread, the use of public transport (at least buses) may become more of a necessity 
and used almost exclusively by lower income households. Of course, one cannot 
generalize, but this conjecture may explain why public transport subsidies are often found 
                                                 
24 As an example, Cropper (2007) reports an elasticity of walking to bus fares between 0.06 and 0.08 for 
Mumbai, India. Thus, a 10% decrease in the bus fares would only decrease walking trip by less than 1%.  
  40to be progressive in developed countries (Frankena, 1973; Asensio, Matas and Reymond, 
2003).   
  
Given the structural limitations that impinge on the performance of transport subsidies, it 
is important to consider broader instruments and policies than those applied in the 
transport sector. Greater considerations should be given to means targeted subsidies —
even when distributed through transport subsidies— and the use of general welfare 
policies to distribute transport benefits to the poor. The evidence presented above for 
utility services and transport subsidies shows that only subsidies that are targeted using 
more sophisticated procedures than mere price reductions have progressive impacts on 
the income distribution.      
 
In addition, given the prevalence of walking or cycling by poor people noted above, it 
may be more effective to use resources to improve sidewalks, crossing bridges and other 
non-motorized transport infrastructure instead of motorized transport subsidies. This 
point has been made by Badami, Tiwari, and Mohan (2004) for India, How and Bryceson 
(2000) for East Africa, SITRASS (2004a and 2004b) in Conakry, Guinea, and Douala, 





This paper has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on public transport 
affordability. In this section we present the main lessons and discuss options for future 
research needed to optimize transport policies aimed at making transport more affordable 
for the poor (and only for the poor).  
 
1)  Transport affordability is an important issue, but current policies are not doing 
much to improve it 
 
Transport affordability is an important issue in developing countries. However, the 
available evidence seems to indicate that current attempts to deal with this issue are not 
successful. Supply-side subsidies are, for the most part, neutral or regressive—even 
without considering the possible effects these subsidies have on operational efficiency. 
Demand-side subsidies perform better, although many of them do not improve income 
distribution. 
 
2)  More needs to be done to target subsidies better 
 
It is important to stress the importance of the targeting the performance of subsidies. A 
policy that has a neutral impact on income distribution is like distributing money 
randomly in society. If the policy objective is to help the poor by using transport 
subsidies, it is imperative to move away from supply-side subsidies towards demand-side 
subsidies. Although this will depend on the policy context, consideration should be given 
to the possibility of focusing subsidies using some type of means-testing procedure.  
 
  413)  Can current subsidies be improved? 
 
One of the conclusions of this paper is that there is very scant literature on the incidence 
of transport subsidies on income distribution. Thus, more research needs to be done to 
determine how current transport affordability policies can be improved. This requires 
quantitative simulation of different subsidy options within the constraints of each policy 
context. For example, in Santiago, Gómez-Lobo (2007a) shows that funding the student 
preferential pass by general taxation instead of cross-subsidies (from other type of users) 
would significantly improve the distributive impact of this policy.  
 
However, there are limits to how much can be done to improve the distributive impact of 
current subsidies. Analogous to the public utility experience, in transport there is an 
access problem that will structurally limit the success of affordability policies; the reason 
is that poor households walk (or cycle) relatively more than higher-income groups. 
Therefore, any affordability policy that operates through public transport fares is bound 
to miss a significant group of poor households that do not have access to the system.
25  
 
In addition, even when the poor use public transport, they tend to demand fewer trips 
than the rich since there is evidence indicating that, for low levels of income, transport 
demand has the characteristics of a luxury good (demand increases more than 
proportionally relative to income). This implies that when subsidies are designed to 
operate through fare reductions, the subsidy as a proportion of income will increase as a 
household’s income increases. In these cases transport is not a very promising good to 
distribute price subsidies. 
 
4)  More consideration should be given to other welfare initiatives outside the 
transport sector 
 
If public transport subsidies have structural limits, other policies should be pursued. 
Subsidies could be channeled to the poor through other mechanisms that are external to 
the transport sector, even if the original motivation is improving transport affordability. 
An example is the direct monetary transfer used in Chile. This type of policy could 
certainly be applied in countries like Mexico that have well-developed welfare programs. 
However, even in countries with less-developed welfare institutions, subsidies may be 
channeled through other means. For example, transport vouchers may be given through 
the same distribution channel used to distribute food subsidies, health services for the 
poor, or assistance to children in poor schools.  
 
If it is assessed that by no means it is possible to use the general welfare system, the use 
of subsidies to reduce fares would not be the best policy alternative. As was stressed 
several times in this paper, when access is a problem and low-income households have to 
rely on walking or cycling as their main mode of transport, the best policy option might 
be to redirect public transport subsidies to fund infrastructure benefiting these modes, or 
more generally, all infrastructure that improves access. 
                                                 
25 Unless the policy in question is able to significantly alter the travel decision of households, which is 
unlikely given the level of monetary subsidies compared to poor households income levels.   
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The main principle is to separate the motivation for a subsidy (transport affordability) 
with the mechanism used to distribute the benefit. To fulfill the objective of a subsidy 
policy, the most effective and progressive instrument should be used, even if this operates 
outside of the transport sector.  
 
5)  More cooperation between transport specialist with social and welfare 
professionals is called for 
 
In order to improve transport affordability measures, more collaboration is needed 
between transport specialists and social and poverty specialists in each country. This will 
enable sectoral policy makers to evaluate the range of opportunities available to 
implement pro-poor affordability measures, avoid untargeted subsidies and integrate 
transport social concerns into wider poverty alleviation efforts.  
 
It may well be that the urban/rural income divide is so wide in a country that any 
transport policy benefiting the urban poor will be regressive. In this case, the whole issue 
of public transport affordability may be called into question. The general message is that 
social issues in transport policy should not be analyzed in isolation.  
 
6)  Data-based policy decisions are required 
 
As an end note, the lack of quantitative data on the sources, distribution and impact of 
subsidies is alarming, in particular in developing countries. The only way to improve 
policy design is to use robust estimation techniques to simulate the impact of the 
available set of policy options. This requires a conscious effort to generate the necessary 
data (in particular, frequent travel surveys with socioeconomic variables) and a firm 
commitment to use the data when designing particular policies and openly debate the 
results of each of the policies being analyzed.   
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Let’s imagine a situation where the price of public transport was initially ppt
0 and at this 
price the individual made qpt
0 trips and consumed qo
0 of a basket of other goods. The 
authorities now wish to decrease the price of public transport. To this end, they subsidize 
the public transport fare, which decreases to ppt
1. At this lower price the individual 
consumes  qpt
1 trips and qo
1 of other goods, and the well being of the individual (as 
reflected by the utility mapping) is higher than in the original situation.  
 




pt pt pt q p p S ⋅ − = . 
 
With the subsidy, the individual faces the following budget constraint (y being his 
income): 
 
y q p q p o o pt pt = ⋅ + ⋅
1 . 
 
Clearly, the final consumption basket chosen by the individual must be feasible, so that it 
must be true that: 
 
y q p q p o o pt pt = ⋅ + ⋅
1 1 1 . 
 
What if the authorities instead of subsidizing the price of public transport just gave the 
individual a transfer of S? The budget constraint faced by the individual is now: 
 
()
1 1 0 0
0
pt pt pt o o pt pt
o o pt pt
q p p y q p q p
S y q p q p
⋅ − + = ⋅ + ⋅
+ = ⋅ + ⋅
 
 
It is trivial now to show that the optimal basket chosen with the price subsidy is feasible 
under this new budget constraint: 
 
( )
1 1 0 1 1 0
pt pt pt o o pt pt q p p y q p q p ⋅ − + = ⋅ + ⋅ . 
 
Thus, the individual could choose the same consumption basket with a transfer as the 
optimal one chosen with a price subsidy, but it may do even better than that as shown in 
the graph. With the price subsidy, the individual moves from point A to B. With the 
transfer, the original budget constraint moves to the right until it reaches point B (since 
we have already shown that point B is feasible with the transfer it must be on the new 
budget constraint). However, with this last budget constraint the individual will have 
other options available —such as point C— that increase its welfare from U
1 to U
2.   
 
  50Thus, for the same amount of resources distributed, the individual is better off with a 
transfer than with a price subsidy. However, it is also evident that consumption of the 
good is lower than if a price subsidy was used. Thus, if society would like to promote the 
actual physical consumption of the good or service, a price subsidy may be preferable. 
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